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abstract
The recent ﬁ  nancial crisis has posed a challenge to the conduct of ﬁ  nancial stability 
and monetary policy. The international debate mainly focused on the potential beneﬁ  ts 
of reducing pro-cyclicality in ﬁ  nancial intermediation in order to avoid boom and bust 
cycles in the supply of credit. We study the stabilization beneﬁ  ts of macro-prudential 
and monetary policy rules that react to an indicator of ﬁ  nancial imbalances. In particular, 
we investigate the beneﬁ  ts of dampening credit cycles and explore the effectiveness 
of alternative policy instruments, such as the interest rate and the loan to value for 
macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial stabilization. We ﬁ  nd that indeed it is appropriate to react 
to ﬁ  nancial imbalances indicators, but such reaction should preferably be undertaken 
by macro-prudential instruments.
Should monetary policy lean against booms in asset prices and ﬁ  nancial variables? Or should ﬁ  nancial 
stability goals be pursued by other instruments, such as LTV ratio (LTV henceforth) ratios? The literature 
on asset-price movements and monetary policy mainly relies on models of exogenous bubbles, as in 
Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002). In this kind of models, the conduct of 
monetary policy cannot affect either the occurrence or the magnitude of boom-bust cycles in asset 
prices. Thus, the policy implication of these models is that the monetary authority does not need to 
pay attention to ﬁ  nancial developments unless ﬁ  nancial stability issues affect the outlook for inﬂ  ation. 
Despite the limited effect of interest-rate policies on asset price bubbles, the conduct of monetary 
policy might have effects on agents’ ﬁ  nancing decisions. Thus, monetary policy could have important 
implications for excessive leverage and, in turn, ﬁ  nancial stability.1
In this article we evaluate if monetary policy should neglect the issue of ﬁ  nancial stability and promote 
the development of other tools to deal with it. To this purpose, we rely on a model of credit-ﬁ  nanced 
real estate booms. Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010) show that boom-bust cycles in housing and 
credit can be generated in a model of the housing market by introducing expectations about future 
macroeconomic developments.2 For instance, housing-market cycles driven by expectations of future 
developments in the demand and supply of houses are characterized by boom-bust dynamics in both 
1  See Woodford (2011) for a review of the recent literature.
2  A recent strand of the business cycle literature investigates the importance of expectation-driven cycles in 
generating economic ﬂ  uctuations. See, for instance, Beautry and Portier (2004, 2006, 2007), Jaimovich and 
Rebelo (2009), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008). In particular, Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2008) 
show that macroeconomic boom-bust cycle coupled with similar dynamics in asset prices can be generated by 
expectations of future development in productivity.
*  The opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of Banco de Portugal or the Eurosys-
tem. Any errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.
**  Banco de Portugal, Departamento de Estudos Económicos.










shousing prices and housing investment. However, only expectations of a future reduction in the supply 
of houses can generate boom-bust cycles in all aggregate quantities such as output, consumption and 
investment as observed in the data.3
In this article, we draw some policy implications relying on a model that allows for macroeconomic booms 
and busts driven by expectations on the supply of houses. In particular, we evaluate the performance 
of macro-prudential and monetary policy in terms of macroeconomic stabilization. We postulate that, 
apart from inﬂ  ation and output stabilization, the policy maker also aims at dampening credit cycles. 
Our ﬁ  ndings highlight a role for LTV ratios that respond in a countercyclical manner to indicators of 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances. LTV ratio rules that actively respond to credit growth reduce the volatility of Credit-
to-GDP and other macroeconomic variables. In the presence of an active LTV ratio policy we ﬁ  nd no 
gains from an interest-rate response to credit aggregates. Pursuing ﬁ  nancial stability goals with policy 
instruments other than the interest rate delivers a better outcome in terms of both macroeconomic 
and ﬁ  nancial stabilization.
The goal of this article is to provide insight into the role of monetary and macro-prudential policy in 
leaning against boom-bust cycles. This article relies on recent research by Lambertini, Mendicino and 
Punzi (2011) that evaluates monetary and macro-prudential policy in terms of both macroeconomic 
stabilization and welfare. Differently from Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2011) we document the 
importance of an active LTV ratio policy based on a simpliﬁ  ed analysis that relies on a loss function 
approach. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 illustrates 
boom-bust cycles as generated by expectations on housing market developments. Section 4 explores 
the effectiveness of stabilization policy in the presence of boom-bust cycles.
1. Model
In this section we brieﬂ  y describe the model economy. The framework follows Iacoviello and Neri (2010). 
The economy is populated by two types of households: Savers and Borrowers. They both consume,  t c  
accumulate housing,  t h  and work in the production of consumption goods,  , ct n  and housing,  , ht n . 
They differ in their discount factor. Borrowers (denoted by ‘) feature a relatively lower subjective discount 
factor that in equilibrium generates an incentive to anticipate future consumption to the current period 
through borrowing. Hence, the ex-ante heterogeneity induces credit ﬂ  ows between the two types of 
agents. This modelling feature has been introduced in macro models by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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Except for the gross nominal interest rate, R , all the variables are expressed in real terms;  t p  is gross 
3  For stylized facts during periods of booms in house prices see Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010), Kannan, 


























































IIinﬂ  ation ()
'
1, , tt c t PP W -  and 
'
, ht W  are the wages paid in the two sectors of production, and  t q  is the 
price of housing in real terms. Houses depreciate at rate  h d .The parameter  t j  is an AR(1) shock that 
represents a shift in the preference for housing with respect to consumption and leisure. The degree of 
habit persistence in consumption is measured by 
' e . Borrowers are allowed to collateralize the value 
of their homes:









Limits on borrowing are introduced through the assumption that households cannot borrow more than 
a fraction m of the next-period value of the housing stock.
The Savers face a similar problem. However, they also invest in capital and receive the proﬁ  ts of the 
ﬁ  rms. As in Smets and Wouters (2007), households supply labour to unions that differentiate labour 
services and sell them to wholesale labour packers in a monopolistic market. Wages can be adjusted 
subject to a Calvo scheme with a given probability every period. The wholesale labour packers transform 
the services into homogeneous labour composites, 
''
,,,, ,,, ct ct ht ht nnnn, to be sold to ﬁ  nal producing ﬁ  rms 
in a competitive market.
Final good producing ﬁ  rms produce non-durable goods (Y) and new houses (IH) facing Cobb-Douglas 
production functions and use capital, k , and labour supplied by the savers, n , and the borrowers, 
' n  
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The housing sector also uses land, l  and an intermediate input,  b k , to produce new houses.
, ht A  measures productivity in the housing sector and is assumed to follow an AR(1) process. Firms pay 
the wages to households and repay back the rented capital\ to the Savers. Retailers, owned by the 
Savers, differentiate ﬁ  nal goods and act in a competitive monopolistic market. Prices can be adjusted 
with probability 1 p q -  every period, by following a Calvo-setting. In contrast, housing prices are 
assumed to be ﬂ  exible.
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where  rr  is the steady state real interest rate and GDP is deﬁ  ned as the sum of consumption and 
investment at steady state prices.
2.  Introducing Boom-Bust Cycle into the Model
Fluctuations in the housing market are mainly generated by shocks to the demand and supply of 
houses. According to Iacoviello and Neri (2010) half of the volatility of housing investment and housing 










shousing market shocks lead to an increase in housing prices, but, cannot generate neither hump-shaped 
dynamics, nor the co-movement in consumption, investment and GDP observed during periods of 
booms in housing prices.
Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010) show that expectations of future macroeconomic developments 
can generate boom-bust cycles in housing and credit. In the following we report the dynamics of the 
model in response to expectations of future shocks to housing demand and supply.4 Chart 1 shows 
the model response to expectations of a negative supply shock, i.e. lower productivity in the housing 
sector. In particular, agents expect that at time T=4 a negative shock to housing productivity hits the 
economy. We illustrate the case in which the expectations turns out be wrong and at time T=4 there 
are no changes in productivity.5
Expectations of lower future in housing supply generate expectations of rising house prices. As a result, 
borrowers increase their current housing demand for speculative purposes. Household indebtedness 
increases, reinforcing the increase in current expenditures in both housing and consumption goods. 
Due to an increased housing demand, current housing prices and housing investment rise. Moreover, 
agents increase their current labor supply in order to smooth the negative future effect of the shock on 
future labor income. When news about changes in future housing supply spread, ﬁ  rms start adjusting 
the stock of capital in order to reduce the future cost of adjusting capital as an input of production, 
induced by the presence of adjustment cost in capital. The stock of capital used as in input of produc-
tion in the housing sector decreases over time. In contrast, ﬁ  rms in the consumption-good sector 
start increasing their stock of capital. Despite the decline of capital used in the housing sector, current 
business investment slightly increases. As a result, GDP rises. As shown in chart 1 4-period anticipated 
negative housing supply shock generates a boom in housing prices, housing investment, consumption, 
GDP, hours and indebtedness. The peak response of all aggregate variables corresponds to the time 
in which expectations realizes. If expectations do not realize there is a dramatic drop in both quanti-
ties and prices. Thus, expectations of a negative housing supply shock that do not realize generate a 
housing market boom-bust cycle.
Expectations of future increases in housing demand generate booming dynamics in housing prices and 
investment but fail in accounting for co-movement between residential and non-residential investment. 
Due to an expected shift in preference for housing relative to consumption, ﬁ  rms in the consumption 
sector reduce their stock of capital. As a result, business investment falls. Because of the reduction in 
business investment during the boom phase, news about a future increase in housing demand fail to 
generate boom-bust dynamics consistent with the data. In the data business investment starts increasing 
on average six periods before the peak in housing prices. Expectations related to future housing demand 
make business investment decline throughout the boom phase. The behavior of business investment is 
independent of the time horizon of the expected increase in housing demand. See Lambertini, Mendi-
cino and Punzi (2010) for further discussion on the sources of booms and busts in the housing market.
4  Housing demand and supply shocks follow an AR(1) process  1, tz t z t zz u r - =+ , where  {} , , th t zj A = . We set 
the persistence and standard deviation of the shocks as in Iacoviello and Neri (2009), such that,  t j  and  , ht A  
equal 0.0416 and 0.0193, respectively.
5  We introduce expectations of future macroeconomic developments to as in Christiano et al. (2008) and assume 
that the error term of the AR(1) shock consists of an unanticipated component,  , zt e , and an anticipated change 
n quarters in advance,  , zt n e -  . So that,  ,, zt zt n u e - =  where  , zt e  is i.i.d and  {} , zh j = . Thus, at time t  agents 
receive a signal about future macroeconomic conditions at time tn +  If the expected movement doesn’t occur, 
then 











































































































































































































































s3.  Macroeconomic and Financial Stabilization
In the following, we assume that ﬂ  uctuations in the model are driven by housing demand and supply 
shocks. In order to allow for booms and busts in house prices and credit we also introduce expecta-
tions related to housing supply. The model’s parameters are set according to the estimated mean values 
presented by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for the US economy.
Macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial stability goals are summarized by the following loss function
222 ,
by





2 s  is the variance of credit growth, inﬂ  ation and GDP growth.
First, we investigate the effectiveness of macro-prudential policy in providing a stable provision of credit 
over the cycle. In particular, we explore the role of the Loan to Value Ratio that responds counter-cyclically 
to the indicator of ﬁ  nancial imbalances. Thus,
() () ( ) 11 11 , tm t m m x t t mm m b b nn n n -- =+ - + - -
Table 1
OPTIMAL STABILIZATION POLICY | LOSS FUNCTIONS
Loan-to-Value rule (LTV) kb=1, kπ =ky=0 kb=0, kπ =ky=1 kb=kπ =ky=1
vb = -136.865 1.21371e-007
Interest rate rule (R)
rπ = 37.6331, ry = 38.2875 1.5121e-006
rπ = 16.9345, ry = 12.7969 (rR = 0) 1.42644e-006
rπ = 10.7144, ry = 1.73584 0.00580687
rπ = 1.85184, ry = -0.333143, rb = 2.71008 0.00022085
Using both rules (R & LTV) 
vb = -165.406, ry = 969.023, ry = 971.556 1.50494e-006
vb = -10.2081, ry = 4.02385, ry = 2.36347, rb = -0.932216 2.47229e-005
Table 2
OPTIMAL STABILIZATION POLICY | VOLATILITY
Benchmark (estimates interest-rate rule) b/GDP q π GDP
rπ = 1.40444, ry = 0.51261, rR = 0.59913 0.1471 0.2346 0.0010 0.0208
Loan-to-Value (LTV)
vb = -136.865 0.0361 0.2349 0.0007 0.0207
Interest rate rule (R)
rπ = 37.6331, ry =38.2875 (rR = 0.59913) 0.1323 0.2344 0.0009 0.0185
rπ =1.85184, ry = -0.333143, rb =2.71008 0.0518 0.2342 0.0038 0.0253
Using both rules (R & LTV) 
vb = -165.406, rπ = 969.023, ry = 971.556 0.0320 0.2348 0.0008 0.0187

























































IIwhere  m  is the steady state value for the LTV ratio,  m n  is an autoregressive parameter that we set 
equal to 0.5, and  x n  is the response to credit growth. We choose the parameters of the LTV rule that 
minimize the volatility of credit aggregates () 0, 0 by kk k p == =  assuming that the monetary authority 
follows the estimated Taylor-type rule. Table 1 compares the alternative rules.
Responding to credit growth is successful in dampening credit cycles. A strong countercyclical response 
to credit growth directly counters the boom in credit driven by expectations of rising house prices and 
the subsequent bust. Thus, compared to the benchmark case it better stabilizes credit aggregates 
without increasing the volatility of inﬂ  ation and GDP. Table 2 shows the unconditional standard devia-
tion of few key variables in the model. Chart 2 shows the behaviour of the LTV ratio and the debt to 
GDP ratio in response to an expected housing supply shock, under the counter-cyclical LTV policy. As a 
result the LTV ratio declines during the boom and increases during the bust. The optimal countercyclical 
LTV policy implies that under a 1.9 per cent expected housing supply shock, the LTV ratio (m  in terms 
of our model) drops by 0.75 per cent. See chart 2.
Second, we investigate how, in the absence of an active macro-prudential policy () t mm = , monetary 
policy can reduce macroeconomic ﬂ  uctuations and affect the magnitude of boom-bust cycles driven 
by expectations of a future reduction in the housing supply. Regarding, monetary policy, we consider 
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Under a passive macro-prudential policy, an interest-rate response to credit growth yields sizable 
gains in terms of ﬁ  nancial stabilization. However, interest-rate rules that aim at ﬁ  nancial stability goals 
() 0 b k ¹  do not deliver the best outcome in terms of macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial stabilization. The 
Chart 2










soptimal countercyclical LTV rule that responds to credit growth is more successful than an interest-rate 
response to credit growth in reducing the volatility of the credit-to-GDP ratio. It also reduces ﬂ  uctua-
tions in GDP and inﬂ  ation.
The use of countercyclical LTV ratio policies improves macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial stabilization. There 
are no gains from an interest-rate response to credit aggregates. In the interaction between macro-
prudential and monetary policy, we ﬁ  nd that pursuing ﬁ  nancial stability goals with LTV ratios delivers the 
lowest volatility of the credit-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, it is also more successful in lowering the volatility 
of inﬂ  ation and GDP. However, none of these policies signiﬁ  cantly affects the volatility of house prices.
4. Conclusion
Housing market ﬂ  uctuations characterized by booms and busts in housing prices and credit are a central 
issue in policy discussions. In the aftermath of the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis high importance has been given 
to the implementation of a policy that could reduce the severity of boom-bust cycles in the provision 
of credit and their spillovers to the macroeconomy.
In macroeconomic models it is particularly difﬁ  cult to generate booms and busts in house prices and 
other macroeconomic variables. Expectations of future productivity shocks in the housing production 
sector can lead to rising dynamics in house prices followed by a sharp reversal. We show that in the 
presence of expectation driven boom-bust cycles, the use of the LTV ratio as a macro-prudential tool 
improves upon interest-rate rules that respond to ﬁ  nancial variables in terms of both macroeconomic 
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